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39 years, compared to 41 for correctional services 
and private security personnel, 44 for lawyers, and 
58  for judges, which was the oldest median age. 
Most police officers, almost 80%, were aged 25 to 
49, while only 57% of the total Canadian labour 
force was between these ages. And more than 47% 
of police officers were between 25 and 39. Relatively 
few police officers were younger than 25 (5%) or 
older than 49 (16%). There were only 235 officers 19 
and younger and 240 officers 65+. As for judges, 
most were 50 years or older (88%).
(Source: Statistics Canada, 2009, Aging of Justice Personnel, Catalogue no. 
85-002-x, Vol. 29, no. 1.)
LAWYER GROWTH OUTPACES 
POLICE
A 2009 Statistics Canada report, “Aging  of Justice 
Personnel”, shows the growth in the number of 
lawyers is outpacing  the growth in the number of 
police officers. Between 1991 and 2006 the number 
of police officers in Canada rose from 61,910 to 
69,305, an overall increase of 7,395 or 12%. 
Lawyers, on the other hand, rose from 53,060 to 
75,105, an increase of 22,045 or 42%. Over the 
same time period, the number of judges increased 
18% (+395), correctional services personnel 18% 
(+3,745), and private security personnel 19% 
(+17,560). This can be compared to a 14% growth in 
the overall Canadian work force. The report 
suggested that the substantial increase in lawyers 
could be attributable to the increased complexity of 
criminal cases. Justice workers represented about 2% 
of all Canadian workers. 
Ages
In 2006 the median age of a police officer was the 
lowest of all workers in justice related occupations at 
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Unless otherwise noted all articles are 
authored by Mike Novakowski, MA. The 
articles contained herein are provided for 
information purposes only and are not to be 
construed as legal or other professional 
advice. The opinions expressed herein are not 
necessarily the opinions of the Justice Institute 
of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to 
this newsletter. If you would like to be added 
to our electronic distribution list e-mail Mike 
Novakowski at mnovakowski@jibc.ca.
POLICE LEADERSHIP 
APRIL 10-13, 2011
Mark your calendars. 
The British Columbia 
Association of Chiefs of 
Police, the Ministry of 
P u b l i c S a f e t y a n d 
Solicitor General, and 
the Justice Institute of 
British Columbia Police 
Academy are hosting  the Police Leadership 2011 
Conference in Vancouver, British Columbia. This 
is Canada’s largest police leadership conference 
and will provide an opportunity for delegates to 
discuss leadership topics presented by world 
renowned speakers.
www.policeleadershipconference.com
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POLICE MAY VIDEOTAPE 
STATEMENT FROM THE OUTSET
R.!v.!Young,!2009 ONCA 891
The accused, disguised in a UPS 
uniform and carrying  a UPS box, 
went into a jewelry store with an 
accomplice and produced a loaded 
shot gun.!He ordered the store owner 
and an employee to lie on the ground and open the 
store safe.! The owner managed to push the alarm 
button and the accused and his accomplice fled, but 
before leaving  he turned back and 
shot the store owner, shattering  his 
shin bone. 
The accused’s fingerprint was found 
on the UPS box and the store 
owner identified him from a photo 
array. He was also interviewed by 
police. The statements the accused 
made were not v ideotaped, 
although the police station had 
facilities available to do so. The 
police officers believed they could 
not record their investigative interview without the 
accused’s permission and, when he was asked, he 
refused to consent to being  videotaped. The accused 
made a series of inculpatory statements to the police 
and provided information they had not known 
before. The accused was charged with nine offences 
including  robbery, use of a firearm and attempted 
murder.!
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice the 
voluntariness of the accused’s statements to police 
became an issue, including  the police failure to 
videotape, even the initial portion of the officers’ 
interview with the accused. During  cross 
examination the officers were adamant that they 
would have been invading  the accused’s privacy and 
that it was unlawful if they started videotaping  the 
accused as soon as he was in the interview room. 
Justice Molloy noted that there is no ironclad rule 
against admitting  a statement that is not tape 
recorded but the Crown will face a heavy onus in 
establishing  voluntariness where recording 
equipment is available but not used. However, Justice 
Molloy found there was an ongoing  misperception 
among  some police officers on the right to videotape 
(or tape record) the taking  of a statement from an 
accused. In her view, police should videotape an 
interview from the outset:
I agree that the taking of a formal statement from 
a suspect is different from filming  the routine 
matters that occur at arrival and booking.! 
However, there is nothing  about the taking  of a 
formal statement that precludes it being  tape 
recorded right from the start.! It is appropriate to 
explain to a suspect that the interview is being 
videotaped and why, and there is 
nothing  wrong with discontinuing 
the videotaping  if the suspect 
does not wish to be recorded.! 
However, there is absolutely no 
legal requirement to start the 
interview without taping and to 
only turn on the recording device 
upon obtaining  consent.! Quite to 
the contrary, the norm should be 
that a suspect is spoken to from 
the outset with the videotape in 
operation. It should only be 
discontinued if the suspect 
objects.
It is not clear to me where these officers got the 
idea that it was unlawful to start the recording 
before getting  permission.! However, this is not 
the first time that I have heard police officers 
speak of it.! It appears to be a commonly held 
view.! Crown counsel in this case was unaware 
why police officers had this understanding, but 
agreed that there was no legal basis for it.! I felt it 
important to comment on this formally in the 
hope that steps would be taken within the police 
force to educate officers on the importance of 
recording interviews from the outset.! [references 
omitted]
The accused was convicted on all counts, but the 
attempt murder charge was reduced to a conviction 
for aggravated assault. He was sentenced to 11 years 
in prison with  four years credit for pre-trial custody.! 
The accused appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
arguing, in part, that the trial judge did not instruct 
the jury strongly enough on why the police failure to 
“In short, the police are 
entitled to begin to videotape 
or tape record an accused’s 
statement. If the accused 
then objects or refuses to be 
videotaped, at least there will 
be a record of the accused’s 
refusal.”
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videotape the statements might affect their reliability 
and weight.!The Appeal Court, however, rejected the 
accused’s submission and affirmed the comments of 
the trial judge regarding  the recording  of statements. 
By at least recording  the suspect from the beginning 
of the interview, if he refused or wished not to have 
his statements taped this recording  would avoid any 
later dispute and a court would not be relying  on the 
bald assertion by police that the suspect refused to 
be recorded. 
“In short, the police are entitled to begin to 
videotape or tape record an accused’s statement,” 
said the Court. “If the accused then objects or 
refuses to be videotaped, at least there will be a 
record of the accused’s refusal.” The accused’s 
appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
UNDERCOVER OPERATION AT 
RAVE NOT ENTRAPMENT
R. v. Yee, 2009 BCPC 0369!
Police set up an undercover drug 
sting  at a Rave attended by about 
5,000 people. The Rave was officially 
sanctioned by the city, held in an ice 
arena, and alcohol was prohibited.! 
Attendees were to be 16 years of age and older and 
pay about $100 per ticket.! For the most part, 
attendees ranged in age from teenagers and to 
people in their early or mid-twenties.! A common 
theme at Raves involved the use of amphetamine, 
commonly known as ecstasy.! People would take 
ecstasy to heighten their senses and in particular 
human touching.! Upwards of 
twelve police officers were 
deployed with three of the 
officers being  undercover, 
t a s ked w i t h pu rcha s i ng 
ecs tasy.! The undercover 
of f icers would randomly 
approach individuals in the 
coliseum and ask if they had 
“any E” for sale.!  The accused 
was standing  in a smoking 
area near the dance floor.! and 
was asked if he had “any E”.!The accused indicated 
he did and led the undercover officer from the 
smoking  area onto the dance floor where he sold 
two tablets of ecstasy for $5 each.! Following  the 
transaction, the undercover officer signalled the 
cover team and the accused was arrested.! Following 
a search incidental to arrest, nine further ecstasy 
tablets along  with two marihuana cigarettes were 
located on the accused.
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
accused was convicted of trafficking  two tablets of 
ecstasy and possessing  nine tablets of ecstasy along 
with two marihuana cigarettes.!However, he argued 
that he was entrapped by the undercover police 
officer and a stay of proceedings ought to be 
directed because the investigative methodology used 
by the police amounted to an abuse of process. He 
contended the police method of walking  up to 
people randomly inviting  them to commit an offence 
when they know nothing  of the individual was not 
be pursuant to a bona fide inquiry, considering  there 
where thousands of people attending  a Rave.! He 
urged that there were other investigative tools which 
could have been pursued pursuant to a bona fide 
inquiry, such as “scoping” of certain individuals 
through static, but effective, surveillance. This would 
more readily identify actual drug  traffickers and 
potentially yield larger dealers than individuals like 
the accused. But he submitted tactics such as 
surveillance were not utilized for reasons of 
expediency.!
The Crown, on the other hand, submitted that the 
police were conducting  a bona fide inquiry; they 
simply presented an opportunity to people who may 
be traffickers and did not hold out any inducement 
to encourage the commission of 
an offence.!The location of the 
Rave at the Coliseum was a 
clearly identifiable geographical 
location. As a result the police 
could present any individual, 
such as the accused, with the 
opportunity to commit the 
particular offence. 
!
“[The] investigation was as a result 
of a reasonable suspicion of drug 
trafficking and not a mere 
suspicion. That reasonable 
suspicion was well founded and the 
investigation resulting in the arrest 
of [the accused] was pursuant to a 
bona fide inquiry.”
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Doctrine of Entrapment
Entrapment is as an aspect of the common law 
doctrine of abuse of process. When! established on a 
balance of probabilities the remedy is a stay of 
proceedings.! It is not entrapment, however, for the 
police to present people with the opportunity to 
commit a particular crime so long  as the police have 
a reasonable suspicion the people are already 
engaged in criminal activity or if the police acted in 
the course of a bona fide investigation. Reasonable 
suspicion is something  more than a mere suspicion 
but something  less than a belief based on reasonable 
and probable grounds.! Reasonable suspicion must 
exist either with respect to the person being  targeted 
or with respect to the area being  targeted. A bona 
fide investigation occurs where the police direct 
their investigation at an area where it is reasonably 
suspected that criminal activity is occurring.!When 
such a location is defined with sufficient precision, 
the police may randomly present any person 
associated with the area with the opportunity to 
commit the particular offence.! Such randomness is 
permissible within the scope of a bona fide inquiry.!!
In this case, Judge Rideout found the police were 
aware that ecstasy was actively trafficked and 
consumed at Raves based on prior investigations.! 
Overdosing  was also of particular concern for 
police.!The police undercover operation at the Rave 
was a bona fide inquiry because both police officers 
clearly established the reasonable suspicion that 
drug  trafficking  in ecstasy would be taking 
place.! The “investigation was as a result of a 
reasonable suspicion of drug  trafficking  and not a 
mere suspicion,” said Judge Rideout. “That 
reasonable suspicion was well founded and the 
investigation resulting  in the arrest of [the accused] 
was pursuant to a bona fide inquiry.”
The accused failed to establish on a balance of 
probabilities that he was entrapped  and the 
application for a stay of proceedings was denied.
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca
CAPB ASKS MP’s TO VOTE 
AGAINST DISMANTLING GUN 
REGISTRY
According  to a recent press release, the Canadian 
Association of Police Boards (CAPB), the national 
association representing  civilian oversight of 
policing  in Canada, has written to all members of 
parliament asking  them to reconsider dismantling 
the gun control system.
 
CAPB’s members provide governance and oversight 
to more than 35,000 municipal police officers and 
chiefs in Canada. In their role as civilian oversight 
bodies, police boards appoint and manage the 
performance of chiefs and deputy chiefs, set policing  
objectives, establish policies, and generally 
represent the public interest. It is from this critical 
and unique vantage point that CAPB advocates for 
strong  firearms laws. CAPB believes such laws to be 
essential for the safety and security of individuals, 
families, communities and police officers and 
accordingly it vigorously opposes any ideologically 
motivated effort to weaken existing  provisions as 
being inimical to the public interest. 
 
As civilian oversight bodies of municipal policing, 
CAPB will not support any attempt to weaken police 
ability to deal with gun violence. At a time when 
gun crime is a serious concern in communities 
across the country, reducing  gun control will be 
irresponsible and a disservice to the cause of 
building safe communities. 
 
If passed, Bill C-391 will not only eliminate the need 
to register more than 8  million rifles and shotguns 
but it will also require that the existing  registration 
records on long  guns be destroyed. The federal 
firearms program is a vital tool for effective policing. 
The registry is consulted thousands of times on a 
daily basis by police services across the country.     
 
CAPB is proud of Canada’s international reputation 
as a country with effective gun control legislation 
and strenuously opposes any legislation that 
weakens Canada’s current firearms registry.   
 
CAPB is, therefore, asking  members of parliament to 
vote against this bill. www.10!8.ca
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FLAWED PATHOLOGICAL 
EVIDENCE RESULTS IN 
ACQUITTAL 
R.!v.!Sherret-Robinson,!2009 ONCA 886!
The accused was charged with the 
first degree murder of her four month-
old-son. Dr. Charles Smith, a once 
w e l l r e s p e c t e d p a t h o l o g i s t , 
performed the autopsy on the infant. 
He testified at the preliminary inquiry that the baby 
died from asphyxia, probably as a result of 
suffocation or smothering  by a third party.!  He also 
testified about other injuries to the infant that 
supported a finding  of intentional killing, namely, 
haemorrhages in the neck tissues, a skull fracture 
and a healing  fracture of the left ankle.!Based on this 
evidence, the accused was committed for trial on 
the charge of first degree murder which was later 
reduced to second degree murder. 
The police, the Crown and the defence all relied 
upon Dr. Smith’s expert opinion and, given his 
stature at the time, the accused and her counsel did 
not believe that they could successfully contest his 
opinion.! Just prior to trial, Crown counsel agreed to 
withdraw the murder charge and lay a charge of 
infanticide.! In return, although she initially pleaded 
not guilty to the infanticide charge, the accused 
agreed not to contest a set of facts that included an 
allegation that she smothered her child.!  The facts 
also set out a summary of the evidence that Dr. 
Smith gave at the preliminary inquiry, including 
reference to the skull fracture and the fracture to the 
child’s ankle. The accused reached an agreement 
with the Crown that led to her conviction for 
infanticide and she was sentenced to one year 
imprisonment. The accused had always maintained 
that she did not harm her child.
Years later Ontario’s Chief Coroner began to review 
45 cases in which Dr. Smith had provided an 
opinion or testified.!  This review eventually led to 
the Inquiry into Pediatric Forensic Pathology in 
Ontario.!  The findings by eminent pathologists and 
other experts demonstrated serious errors by Dr. 
Smith in many cases.! In this case, Dr. Smith’s 
opinion was wrong  in several important respects.! 
The skull fracture was, in fact, a normal developing 
cranial suture.!The haemorrhages to the neck were, 
in fact, dissection-related artefacts from the autopsy 
itself.!  As for the injury to the left ankle, the experts 
could say only that it could have been caused 
deliberately or accidentally.!The experts also stated 
that other findings relied upon by Dr. Smith, the 
petechial haemorrhages and congestion of the lungs, 
are common findings in infant deaths and not 
diagnostic of an intentional act. And although Dr. 
Smith found swelling  of the brain, the new expert 
evidence shows that there was no evidence of 
swelling  of the brain. As to the cause of death, the 
experts could find no positive evidence to support a 
finding  of suffocation or smothering  by a third party.! 
At the time of his death, the infant was not sleeping 
in a regular crib, but rather in a playpen that 
contained blankets and quilts.!The autopsy findings 
and the findings at the scene suggest that death 
probably occurred by an accidental asphyxial means 
in an unsafe sleeping environment.
In the Ontario Court of Appeal the accused sought to 
have the new information regarding  Dr. Smith’s 
opinion admitted as fresh evidence.! The Crown 
conceded this material met the test for fresh 
evidence and that the fresh expert opinion now 
conclusively refutes critical aspects of Dr. Smith’s 
opinion; an opinion that was a central underpinning 
of the Crown’s case at trial and without that 
evidence there was no reasonable prospect of 
conviction. Had the evidence been available back at 
the time of the incident the Crown would have never 
proceeded with a prosecution. The fresh evidence 
was compelling  and although not conclusive of the 
cause of death, it is likely the infant died 
accidentally.
In this case, the the accused was wrongfully 
convicted of infanticide because of the flawed 
pathological evidence, she was subject of a 
miscarriage of justice, served a one-year jail 
sentence and lost the custody of her other child. The 
fresh evidence was admitted, the appeal was 
allowed, the conviction for infanticide was set aside 
and an acquittal was entered.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
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BC’s NEW ‘ASSISTANCE TO 
SHELTER ACT’
British Columbia’s new Assistance 
to Shelter Act is now in effect. This 
new p rov inc i a l l e g i s l a t i on 
establishes a scheme for issuing 
and cancelling  extreme weather alerts and gives 
police officers authority to transport persons at risk 
to emergency shelters when extreme weather alerts 
are in effect. 
Here is how it works. A “community representative” 
or the Minister of Housing  and Social Development 
(or delegate) may issue an “extreme weather alert.” 
In the case of a community representative they may 
determine when extreme weather conditions exist, 
issue an extreme weather alert, notify the minister 
and all police forces within the geographical area 
where the Extreme Weather Response Plan applies, 
determine when the extreme weather conditions no 
longer exist, cancel the extreme wether alert and 
notify the minister and all police forces within the 
geographical area of the cancelation (s.2(2)). The 
minister also has the power to cancel an extreme 
weather alert issued by a community representative 
where the community representative fails to cancel it 
and extreme weather conditions no longer exist. 
Notification to the police force of the extreme 
weather alert called or cancelled by the community 
representative or Minister must be done by written 
report (fax or by electronic mail) and include:
the date of the issuance/cancellation of the 
extreme weather alert;
the time of the issuance/cancellation of the 
extreme weather alert;
the description of the extreme weather 
conditions that led to the issuance/
cancellation of the extreme weather alert;
the description of the geographical area to 
which the extreme weather alert applies/
applied;
the name of the person issuing/cancelling 
the extreme weather alert;
(f)!the names of the persons or entities that 
will be notified by the community 
representa t ive or the minis ter, as 
applicable, of the issuance/cancellation of 
the extreme weather alert as required under 
the Act.
(see ss.3-6 of the Assistance to Shelter Regulation)
The Minister, or their delegate, may issue an extreme 
weather alert where extreme conditions exist in a 
geographical area but there is no Extreme Weather 
Response Plan for the area. As well, the Minister 
may also issue an alert where extreme weather 
conditions exist but are not addressed or identified 
in the Extreme Weather Response Plan for that area, 
or extreme weather conditions exist as described in 
the Extreme Weather Response Plan for the area but 
the community representative has not issued the 
alert. (s.3)
Assessment
Where an extreme weather alert is in effect, a 
police officer may assess whether a person is at risk: 
A police officer includes a person under the Police 
Act who “is a provincial constable or municipal 
constable or has the powers of a provincial 
constable or municipal constable.” In assessing  risk, 
the police officer must consider a number of factors:
s.5(1) If an extreme weather alert has been issued 
under section 2 or 3 and is in effect, a police 
officer may assess whether a person is a person 
at risk.
s.5(2) In an assessment under subsection (1), a 
police officer must consider whether all of the 
following apply:
(a) the person is in the geographical area to 
which the extreme weather alert applies;
(b) the person is, or reasonably appears to be, 19 
years of age or older;
(c) the person, in the opinion of the police 
officer, is suffering physical harm or is at risk of 
suffering  physical harm because of the extreme 
weather conditions;
(d) any other prescribed considerations.
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Request to Attend Emergency Shelter
Under s.6(1) of the Act, the police may request a 
person at risk to go to emergency shelter or 
accommodation:
An “emergency shelter” is defined as “a building  or 
a portion of a building  that is used to provide 
temporary accommodation free of charge to persons 
to meet the persons' immediate basic needs for 
shelter.”
Transport and Use of Force
Under s.7 of the Act a police officer may use 
reasonable force to transport a person at risk to an 
emergency shelter if they refuse or fail to respond to 
an officer’s request that the person go accompanied 
or unaccompanied to a shelter:
Complete legislation available at www.bclaws.ca
YOUTH ATTITUDES TOWARDS 
POLICING
In  recently released report (June 2009) the Police 
Sector Council commissioned a study by Ipsos Reid 
involving  youth between the ages of 16 to 27. As 
part of the study, the group looked at the attitudes of 
youth towards policing:
Youth say first hand contact with police 
officers/civilian employees (excluding 
friends and family), television news 
programs, and first hand contact with 
police officers who are friends or family 
members have shaped their views of 
policing the most.
 
A majority of youths disagree that being  a 
police officer means you’re not allowed to 
think on your own. 
A majority of youth agree that being  a 
police officer means you have to be a role 
model for others. They also say that the 
police play a positive role in society and 
that the police play a positive role in their 
community. 
While youth agree that the police play a 
positive role in society, they also feel that 
the police should be more active in their 
community.
 
A majority of Canadian youth agree that 
the ethnic make up of any given police 
force should be a refection of the 
community it serves. While youth agree 
that the make up of a police service should 
reflect the community, the same proportion 
agree that in some cultural communities 
policing  is not seen as a positive career 
choice.
Complete report at:
www.policecouncil.ca/reports/PSCYouthFocus1.pdf
s. 7! If a person at risk refuses to comply with or 
fails to respond to the police officer's request 
under section 6, the police officer, using 
reasonable force if necessary, may transport the 
person at risk to an emergency shelter.
s.6(1) If a police officer has made an assessment 
under section 5 that a person is a person at risk, 
the police officer may request the person at risk 
to choose to
(a) accompany the police officer to an 
emergency shelter, or
(b) go unaccompanied to
(i) an emergency shelter, or
(ii) any other accommodation that would 
protect the person at risk from the extreme 
weather conditions.
(2) For purposes of subsection (1) (b) (ii), the 
accommodation must be accommodation
(a) to which the person at risk can secure entry,
(b) in which the person at risk is entitled or 
permitted to reside,
(c) that is a structure, vehicle or vessel primarily 
designed to be used as living quarters and 
provides protection from physical harm or risk of 
physical harm due to extreme weather 
conditions, and
(d) that meets any other prescribed conditions.
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s.172.1 CC REQUIRES 
SUBJECTIVE STANDARD OF 
FAULT
R. v. Legare, 2009 SCC 56
!
The 32 year old accused, claiming  to 
be 17, engaged in two private online 
“chats” with the complainant, who 
was 12 years old at the time.!He was 
in Alberta and the complainant was 
in Ontario. They first “met” in a public chat forum 
but moved “fairly quickly” from a public to a private 
chat.! The initial exchanges were not recorded but 
the accused admitted that the private chat was 
sexual in nature. The second private chat was 
recorded and was almost entirely sexual and 
included words by both parties indicating  a desire to 
engage in explicit sexual activity with each other. 
During  the chat, the complainant told the accused 
she was 13, even though she was 12. The 
complainant gave the accused her phone number 
and he called, telling  the complainant — in coarse 
and explicit language — that he “would love” to 
perform oral sex on her.!The complainant hung  up 
and there were no further calls.!
!
The complainant’s father became aware of the 
conversation and notified the police. A transcript of 
the second chat was eventually retrieved. Nearly 
two years after the chat sessions, the accused was 
arrested and his computer was seized but no child 
pornography or record of other incriminating 
communications was found. The accused was 
charged with invitation to sexual touching  under s.
152 of the Criminal Code and luring  a child under s. 
172.1(1)(c).
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench the 
judge characterized the accused’s conduct as “both 
despicable and repugnant”, but found that it was not 
caught by either ss.152 or 172.1(1)(c).! The trial 
judge analysed both the actus reus (prohibited act) 
and the mens rea (culpable intent) that constituted 
the essential elements of s.! 172.1(1)(c).! Regarding 
the actus reus, the trial judge found the Crown was 
bound — but had failed — to establish that the 
accused’s conduct facilitated the commission of one 
of the specified secondary offences under ss. 151 or 
152.  With respect to the mens rea, the trial judge 
accepted defence counsel’s submission that the 
phrase “for the purpose of facilitating  the 
commission of an offence” requires an intention to 
lure for the specific purpose contemplated by s. 
172.1(1)(c).!  Although the judge recognized that the 
Crown was not required to prove that the accused 
intended to carry out the specified secondary 
offence he nonetheless concluded that the accused 
must be shown to have intended to lure a child for 
that purpose.! The accused had not arranged a 
meeting  with the complainant nor did he intend to 
do so. His intention to “talk dirty” was insufficient. 
Interpreting  s. 172.1 otherwise would cast “the net 
too wide.” The accused was acquitted on both 
counts. 
On appeal to the Alberta Court of Appeal the 
accused’s acquittal on s.152 was affirmed but his 
acquittal on s.172.1 was set aside and a new trial 
was ordered. The Appeal Court ruled that the trial 
judge adopted an unduly narrow interpretation of s.
172.1(1)(c) by requiring, as an essential element of 
that offence, a “present intent to bring  about an 
opportunity to commit one of the secondary 
offences”.!  The trial judge erred in law in his 
interpretation of the requisite actus reus and mens 
rea under s.!172.1(1)(c). 
The accused then appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada, seeking  the reinstatement of his acquittal 
without a new trial. Justice Fish, authoring  the 
unanimous judgment for the seven member 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Internet
“The Internet is an open door to 
knowledge, entertainment, 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n - a n d 
exploitation.” - Supreme Court of 
Canada  Justice Fish in R. v. Legare,  2009 SCC 56 
at para. 1.
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Supreme Court of Canada first noted that Parliament 
had adopted legislation under s.172.1 “to shut [the] 
door on predatory adults who, generally for a sexual 
purpose, troll the Internet for vulnerable children 
and adolescents.! Shielded by the anonymity of an 
assumed online name and profile, they aspire to 
gain the trust of their targeted victims through 
computer ‘chats’ — and then to tempt or entice 
them into sexual activity, over the Internet or, still 
worse, in person.” Section 172.1 criminalizes 
preparatory conduct even more remote from the 
infliction of harm than other incipient or inchoate 
crimes, such as attempt and counselling  or 
procuring  the commission of an offence. He then 
went on to outline the elements of a charge under s.
172.1(1)(c):
[Section] 172.1 of the Criminal Code ... 
prohibits the use of computers to communicate 
with underage persons “for the purpose of 
facilitating the commission” of a specified (or 
secondary) offence.! And, more particularly still, 
our concern is with s. 172.1(1)(c), which consists 
o f th ree e lements : (1 ) an in tent ional 
communication by computer; (2) with a person 
whom the accused knows or believes to be 
under 14 years of age; (3) for the specific 
purpose of facilitating  the commission of a 
specified secondary offence — that is, abduction 
or one of the sexual offences mentioned in 
s.! 172.1(1)(c) with respect to that person.! 
Included among them is “Invitation to sexual 
touching”, a crime under s. 152 of the Code. 
[references omitted, para. 3]
And further
It will immediately be seen that s. 172.1(1)(c) 
creates an incipient or “inchoate” offence, that 
is, a preparatory crime that captures otherwise 
legal conduct meant to culminate in the 
commiss ion of a completed cr ime.! I t 
criminalizes conduct that precedes the 
commission of the sexual offences to which it 
refers, and even an attempt to commit them.! 
Nor, indeed, must the offender meet or intend to 
meet the victim with a view to committing any 
of the specified secondary offences.! This is in 
keeping with Parliament’s objective to close the 
cyberspace door before the predator gets in to 
prey.
!... ... ...
!
What s. 172.1(1) prohibits is thus apparent both 
from its remedial purpose and from the express 
terms adopted by Parliament to achieve that 
objective.
Section 172.1(1) makes i t a crime to 
communicate by computer with underage 
children or adolescents for the purpose of 
facilitating the commission of the offences 
mentioned in its constituent paragraphs.!  In this 
context, “facilitating” includes helping to bring 
about and making easier or more probable — for 
example, by “luring” or “grooming” young 
persons to commit or participate in the 
prohibi ted conduct; by reducing their 
inhibitions; or by prurient discourse that exploits 
a young person’s curiosity, immaturity or 
precocious sexuality.
!
I hasten to add that sexually explicit language is 
not an essential element of the offences created 
by s. 172.1.!  Its focus is on the intention of the 
accused at the time of the communication by 
BY THE BOOK:
 s. 172.1(1) Criminal Code
Every person commits an offence who, 
by means of a computer system within 
the meaning of subsection 342.1(2), 
communicates with ... (c)!  a person 
who is, or who the accused believes is, 
under the age of fourteen years, for the 
purpose of facilitating  the commission of an offence 
under section 151 [sexual interference] or 152 
[invitation to touching], subsection 160(3) [bestiality] 
or 173(2) [exposure of genitals] or section 281 
[abduction] with respect to that person.
Note: Section s. 172.1(1)(c) as it read at the time of 
trial has since been renumbered as 172.1(1)(b) and 
amended to raise the underage requirement to 16 
years! from 14. 
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computer.! Sexually explicit 
comments may suf f ice to 
establish the criminal purpose of 
the accused.! But those who use 
their computers to lure children 
for sexual purposes often groom 
them online by first gaining  their 
trust through conversations 
about their home life, their 
personal interests or other 
innocuous topics.
!
... ... ...
!
Accordingly, the content of the 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n i s n o t 
necessarily determinative: what 
matters is whether the evidence 
as a whole establishes beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the 
accused communicated by 
computer with an underage 
victim for the purpose of facilitating the 
commission of a specified secondary offence in 
respect of that victim.
!
The italicized words in the preceding  paragraph, 
drawn textually from 172.1! (1)(c), make clear 
that the intention of the accused must be 
determined subjectively.! ... [T]he accused must 
be shown to have “engage[d] in the prohibited 
communication with the specific intent of 
facilitating  the commission of one of the 
designated offences” with respect to the 
underage person who was the intended recipient 
of communication ... [references omitted, paras. 
25-32] 
As a result, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
application of a subjective standard of fault was the 
appropriate mens rea required to prove the offence 
of s. 172.1.!  “Requiring  the Crown to prove that the 
accused communicated by computer with the 
specific intent mandated by the plain language of 
the provision helps to ensure that innocent 
communication will not be unintentionally captured 
by the Code,” said Justice Fish:
To sum up ... s. 172.1(1)(c) comprises three 
elements: (1) an intentional communication by 
computer; (2) with a person whom the accused 
knows or believes to be under 14 years of age; 
(3) for the specific purpose of 
facilitating the commission of a 
specified secondary offence — 
that is, abduction or one of the 
sexual offences mentioned in 
s.!172.1(1)(c) — with respect to 
the underage person.
!
All three elements must, of 
course, be established by the 
Crown beyond a reasonable 
doubt.
!
In determining whether the 
Crown has discharged its 
burden under s. 172.1, it is 
n e i t h e r n e c e s s a r y n o r 
particularly helpful for trial 
judges to recast every element 
of the offence in terms of its 
actus reus, or “act” component, 
and its mens rea, or requisite 
mental element.! As in the case of attempt, s. 
172.1 criminalizes otherwise lawful conduct 
when its specific purpose is to facilitate the 
commission of a specified secondary offence 
with respect to an underage person.! Separately 
considered, neither the conduct itself nor the 
purpose alone is sufficient to establish guilt: It is 
not an offence under s. 172.1 to communicate 
by computer with an underage person, nor is it 
an offence under s. 172.1 to facilitate the 
commission of a specified secondary offence in 
respect of that person without communicating 
by computer.!!
!
In this unusual context, determining whether 
each of the essential elements ... constitutes all 
or part of the actus reus or mens rea of s. 
172.1(1)(c) is of no assistance in reaching the 
appropriate verdict on a charge under that 
p rov i s ion .! More spec i f ica l ly, fo rc ib ly 
compartmentalizing the underage requirement 
of s. 172.1(1)(c) — “a person who is, or who the 
accused believes is, under the age of fourteen 
years” — as either part of the actus reus or part 
of the mens rea, may well introduce an element 
of confusion in respect of both concepts.
Is it part of the actus reus that the accused 
communicated with a person of any age whom 
the accused believed to be under 14?!Is it part of 
the mens rea that the person was in fact under 
“s. 172.1(1)(c) comprises three 
elements: (1) an intentional 
communication by computer; 
(2) with a person whom the 
accused knows or believes to 
be under 14 years of age; (3) 
for the specific purpose of 
facilitating the commission of a 
specified secondary offence 
— that is, abduction or one of 
the sexual offences mentioned 
in s.!172.1(1)(c) — with respect 
to the underage person.”
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14?!I see no conceptual or practical advantage in 
attempting  to resolve these questions.!It seems to 
me preferable, in setting out the elements of 
s.! 172.1, to adopt “language which accurately 
conveys the effect of the law without in itself 
imposing an unnecessary burden of translation 
and explanation”. !
I believe that the elements of the offence, as I 
have set them out, achieve that objective: They 
satisfy the principle of legality by affording  the 
required degree of certainty, respecting the will 
of Parliament, and reflecting  “the overall need to 
use the criminal law with restraint”. 
!
Finally, it is neither necessary nor necessarily 
sufficient for the impugned acts of the accused 
to be objectively capable of facilitating the 
commission of the specified secondary offence 
with respect to the underage person concerned.! 
Accordingly, the content of the communication 
is not necessarily determinative: What matters ... 
is whether the evidence as a whole establishes 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused 
communicated by computer with an underage 
victim for the purpose of facilitating  the 
commission of a specified secondary offence 
with respect to that victim. [references omitted, 
paras. 36-42]
!
The trial judge adopted an unduly restrictive 
construction of s.172.1(1)(c) and misapprehended 
the essential elements of the offence.! The accused’s 
appeal was dismissed and the order of the Alberta 
Court of Appeal setting  aside the acquittal and 
ordering a new trial was upheld.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
PRESENCE OF CELL PHONE 
IRRELEVANT TO LIMITATION ON 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
R. v. Bell, 2009 ONCA 321
!
At about 1:30 a.m. police observed 
the accused, with a passenger, 
speeding. They followed his truck 
into the downtown core area of the 
city. The accused was stopped and 
could be seen through the rear window of the 
pickup truck drinking  something  with his head tilted 
back.! The accused exited from the driver's seat of 
the pickup truck and walked towards the officer who 
was standing  at the rear left-hand corner of the truck.! 
The officer questioned the accused about drinking  in 
his vehicle, but he denied consuming  alcohol while 
in it.!The accused had a strong  odour of alcoholic 
beverage on his breath and that his eyes were 
bloodshot. An open bottle of Budweiser beer was 
found in the truck. 
The officer formed a reasonable suspicion that the 
accused was driving  a motor vehicle with alcohol in 
his body and read the approved screening  device 
(ASD) demand, but did not have one with him. He 
called for one to be delivered to his location and it 
was delivered a minute later by another officer.!The 
officer told the accused that he had to wait 15 
minutes to administer the ASD (because of the 
potential presence of mouth-alcohol and the need 
for it to dissipate).! After waiting, the accused 
subsequently provided a breath sample and 
registered a "Fail".! The accused was arrested for 
operating  a motor vehicle while over 80mg%, read 
his right to counsel, given a demand for a breath 
sample under s.254(3) of the Criminal Code, and 
advised of the standard police caution. The accused 
said he wanted to talk to a lawyer and was 
transported to the police station, located 
approximately 1 1/2 blocks away, where he spoke to 
a lawyer of his choice. He subsequently provided 
breath readings of 176 mg% and 181mg% and was 
charged with operating  a motor vehicle with more 
than 80mg%. 
In the Ontario Court of Justice the trial judge noted 
that the accused was stopped only a one to two 
minute walk from the police station and less than a 
one minute drive away. The officer did not ask the 
accused if he had a cell phone (which he did) and 
the officer himself was carrying  his own personal 
cell phone.!However, the officer decided to wait 15 
minutes because he believed the accused has just 
consumed alcohol in the truck. In the trial judge’s 
view the officer’s decision to wait 15 minutes before 
administering  the ASD test was appropriate. There 
was no need to provide the accused with an 
opportunity to consult counsel during  the 15 minute 
waiting period. The accused was convicted.
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The Fraser Valley Criminal Justice Conference will be held at the Ramada Plaza and 
Conference Centre in Abbotsford, British Columbia from April 27-30, 2010. The 2010 
Conference Topic is “Youth, Communities and the Criminal Justice System.” Speakers 
will include Supt. Dan Malo, Andrée Cazabon, Dr. Irwin Cohen, Dr. Matt Logan, Crystal Meth 
Society, Glen Flett, Dr. Lohrasbe, Sgt. Chris Thompson, Rosalind Currie, Diane Sowden, Dr. 
Ray Corrado, Dr. Mary Ellen O'Toole, Det. Judy Dizy, Det. Chris Eeg, Gil Johnston, and Victor 
Porter. For more information visit:
The accused then appealed to 
the Ontario Superior Court of 
Jus t ice arguing  tha t the 
availability of the cell phone 
and the proximity to the police 
s t a t i o n w e r e r e l e v a n t 
considerations in determining 
whether there was a realistic 
o p p o r t u n i t y t o c o n s u l t 
counsel. The appeal court 
judge found that in this case, 
“the ready availability of a cell 
phone and the location where 
the [accused] was stopped 
being  in close proximity to the police station were 
not relevant considerations in determining  whether 
the [accused’s] right to counsel had been breached.” 
“[T]he officer was entitled to delay taking  the breath 
sample for up to 15 minutes to allow mouth alcohol 
to dissipate in order to enable a proper analysis of 
the [accused’s] breath to be made,” said the appeal 
judge. “The delay, on the facts in this 
case, was a justifiable limitation on 
the [accused’s] right to counsel.” The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed and 
the certificate of analysis was 
properly admitted in evidence.
On further appeal by the accused to 
the Ontario Court of Appeal his 
argument was again dismissed. In a 
short endorsement, the Ontario Court 
of Appeal stated:
To be clear, when there is a 15 
minute delay for the purpose of 
obtaining  a proper breath sample, the demand is 
valid and the delay is a justified limitation on the 
right to counsel under s. 10(b). The fact that the 
detainee or the officer had cell phones is 
therefore irrelevant. [para. 2] 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
Lower court case available at www.canlii.org
“[W]hen there is a 15 minute 
delay for the purpose of 
obtaining a proper breath 
sample, the demand is valid and 
the delay is a justified limitation 
on the right to counsel under 
s. 10(b). The fact that the 
detainee or the officer had cell 
phones is therefore irrelevant.”
www.fvcjc.ca
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Fraser Valley Criminal Justice Conference 2010 
Youth, Communities and the Criminal Justice System 
Aprii ll   27-  30,,   2010  
www.fvcjc.ca 
Programme 
 
 
 
TUESDAY, April 27, 2010 
5:00 pm- 7:00pm          Registration 
7:00 pm – 9:00 pm  Evening Welcome Reception  
 
 
WEDNESDAY, April 28, 2010 
8:00 am – 8:30 pm          Registration and Continental Breakfast 
8:30 am – 9:00 pm Opening Ceremonies/ Welcoming Remarks  
Deputy Chief Rick Lucy 
9:00 am – 12:00 am 
 
Understanding Gangs 
Keynote Address: Gil Johnston (SIO) and Supt. Dan Malo 
12:00pm - 1:00 pm  Lunch 
1:00pm –  2 :00 pm 
Gangs in Prison 
Gil Johnston 
Criminal Investigations and 
Computer Forensics 
Det. Chris Eeg 
Risk Profiles for Serious and 
Violent Youth Offending  
Dr. Ray Corrado and  
Dr. Irwin Cohen 
 Move to Afternoon Break Out Session 
2:30 pm – 3:30 pm 
Active Shooters 
Sgt. Chris Thompson 
Crystal Meth- A 
Community Response 
METH BC  
Youth Violent Offender 
Programming in British 
Columbia: An Overview 
Dr. Heather Gretton and 
Dr. Grant Burt 
3:30 pm – 4:30 pm  Meet the Speakers and Questions  
 
6:00 pm – 9:00 pm  COMMUNITY FORUM (Matsqui Auditorium) 
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The Early Bird registration fee is $329 for payments received prior to January 15th, 2010. 
Thereafter, a regular registration fee of $399 will apply. The Ramada Inn Hotel is providing 
accommodations for approximately $120/night on a first come, first serve basis.
The full three-day conference will entail keynote addresses and break-out sessions that are 
carefully orchestrated to best suit a varied audience. One of the key goals of the conference is to 
bring together professionals in the field that can speak from their experiences and established 
expertise to assist in early intervention, prevention, and risk management. The participants will 
have an opportunity to network and build partnerships to meet individual organizational goals, 
as well as the common objective of reducing crime in our communities.
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THURSDAY, April 29, 2010 
8:00 am – 9:00 am           Continental Breakfast 
9:00 am – 12:00 pm Engaging with Youth  
Andrée Cazabon – Filmmaker and former street youth 
12:00 pm – 1:00 pm Lunch Break  
TCO 2 Presentation 
1:00 pm – 2:00 pm 
It Can Happen to Anyone 
Diane Sowden 
BC’s Office to Combat 
Trafficking in Persons 
Victor Porter and 
Rosalind Currie 
Youth, Homicide and 
Aggression 
Dr. Michael Woodworth 
 Move to Afternoon Break Out Session 
2:30 pm – 3:30 pm It Can Happen to Anyone 
(Part II) 
Dianne Sowden 
Project Resiliency 
D. Bassi, P. Thomas,  
D. Pearn, C. Pettit 
Fishing Upstream 
Dr. Matt Logan and  
Glen Flett 
3:30 pm – 4:30 pm Meet the Speakers and Questions 
 
 
 
FRIDAY, April 30, 2010 
8:00 am – 9:00 am           Continental Breakfast 
9:00 am – 12:00 pm The Mission Oriented Shooter:  
Case Studies of the Worst School and Campus Shootings; Implications for 
Law Enforcement, Mental Health and School Professionals 
Dr. Mary Ellen O’Toole 
12:00 pm – 1:00 pm Lunch Break  
Honourable Kash Heed 
Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General 
1:00 pm – 2:00 pm False Allegation of Child Abduction: 
Lessons since Susan Smith 
Kathleen E. Canning 
 Break 
2:15 pm – 4:00 pm Psychiatric Issues in Murder cases 
Wendy Dawson, QC, Dr. Matt Logan, Dr. Lohrasbe 
3:30 pm – 4:30 pm Meet the Speakers and Questions 
 
 
Updated December 7, 2009 
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THURSDAY, April 29, 2010 
8:00 am – 9:00 am           Continental Breakfast 
9:00 am – 12:00 pm Engaging with Youth  
Andrée Cazabon – Filmmaker and former street youth 
12:00 pm – 1:00 pm Lunch Break  
TCO 2 Presentation 
1:00 pm – 2:00 pm 
It Can Happen to Anyone 
Diane Sowden 
BC’s Office to Combat 
Trafficking in Persons 
Victor Porter and 
Rosalind Currie 
Youth, Homicide and 
Aggression 
Dr. Michael Woodworth 
 Move to Afternoon Break Out Session 
2:30 pm – 3:30 pm It Can Happen to Anyone 
(Part II) 
Dianne Sowden 
Project Resiliency 
D. Bassi, P. Thomas,  
D. Pearn, C. Pettit 
Fishing Upstream 
Dr. Matt Logan and  
Glen Flett 
3:30 pm – 4:30 pm Meet the Speakers and Questions 
 
 
 
FRIDAY, April 3 , 2010 
8:00 am – 9:00 am           Continental Breakfast 
9:00 am – 12:00 pm The Mission Oriented Shooter:  
Case Studies of the Worst School and Campus Shootings; Implications for 
Law Enforcement, Mental Health and School Professionals 
Dr. Mary Ellen O’Toole 
12:00 pm – 1:00 pm Lunch Break  
Honourable Kash Heed 
Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General 
1:00 pm – 2:00 pm False Allegation of Child Abduction: 
Lessons since Susan Smith 
Kathleen E. Canning 
 Break 
2:15 pm – 4:00 pm Psychiatric Issues in Murder cases 
Wendy Dawson, QC, Dr. Matt Logan, Dr. Lohrasbe 
3:30 pm – 4:30 pm Meet the Speakers and Questions 
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JUDGE NOT EXPECTED TO LEAVE 
COMMON SENSE AT 
COURTROOM DOOR 
R. v. Twohey, 2009 BCCA 428
Two police officers saw the accused 
sitting  alone in his vehicle and talking 
on a cell phone. The police checked 
the license plate and discovered that 
the accused was prohibited from 
possessing  a cellular telephone. When they went 
back to speak to the accused, his vehicle was gone 
but they found him four or five blocks away. The 
police stopped the accused, who was still alone in 
the vehicle. He was arrested and searched and 
police found $860 in $20 and $50 bills, but no cell 
phone on his person. When asked where the cell 
phone was he replied that he had tossed it out the 
window.
The vehicle, of which the accused was the registered 
lessee, was searched and one of the officers located 
a cellular telephone battery, a SIM card and a battery 
cover for the back of a cellular telephone in the area 
between the driver’s seat and the middle console. 
Two large Samurai swords were found in the back 
seat. A dog  handler and drug-sniffing  dog  were 
called; the dog  “hit” on the driver’s side power 
console for the windows and the police located a 
black pouch containing  12 small baggies containing 
9.5 grams of cocaine, as well as a cellular telephone 
which was missing  the SIM card, battery and battery 
cover. Police put all the parts of the telephone 
together. The display indicated three missed calls 
and the phone began ringing  right away. The callers 
were seeking to buy drugs.
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court neither 
officer could say that the telephone they found was 
the same telephone they saw the accused using. 
However, they did not find any other cellular 
telephones in the car. The trial judge concluded that 
if the telephone found in the compartment was the 
same telephone that the police had observed the 
accused using, then the inevitable inference was that 
the accused knew about the hiding  place and 
therefore he knew about the drugs.
The trial judge did not accept the accused’s unsworn 
statement that he tossed the telephone out the 
window. The accused was convicted for possessing 
cocaine for the purpose of trafficking  under s. 5(2) of 
the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and 
sentenced to a six month conditional sentence.
The accused appealed to the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal arguing  the trial judge’s finding  that he 
possessed the cocaine was unreasonable, and that 
the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and 
drew the wrong  inferences from the evidence. He 
submitted that there was no direct evidence that he 
knew about the drugs hidden under the power 
window console. In his view, the trial judge’s 
conclusion that he knew about the drugs turned on 
the judge’s finding  that the cell phone located by the 
police was the same cell phone he was seen talking 
on, but his explanation that he tossed the telephone 
out the window was improperly rejected. Plus, since 
there was a brief period of time when the police did 
not have the accused under observation, he 
contended that the trial judge could not conclude 
that the telephone he was talking  on was the same 
telephone the police found. The accused contended 
there was no evidence connecting  him to the drugs 
found in the car as there was no forensic evidence 
linking him to the pouch of cocaine.
“It is not disputed that in order to find that the 
[accused] possessed the drugs the learned trial judge 
needed to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 
that he had knowledge and control of the drugs,” 
said Justice Bennett. “Knowledge and control does 
not need to be proved by direct evidence. Such a 
finding  can be made based on circumstantial 
evidence, but only when the trier of fact is satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the guilt of the 
accused is the only reasonable inference to be 
drawn from the proven facts.”
In this case, the trial judge’s conclusion that the 
police saw the accused using  this cell phone was 
supported by the evidence. Only one telephone was 
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found in the car, although 
it was in parts. When put 
together, it displayed three 
missed calls and began to 
r ing  cont inual ly. The 
accused’s submission that 
there were other rational 
explanations which were 
overlooked was rejected. 
The accused's contention 
that he threw his cell 
phone out the window 
and that some other unknown person or prior owner 
of the vehicle put a disassembled, but functioning 
telephone in the car, did not stand up in the face of 
the evidence as a whole. Nor did the accused’s 
related argument that some unknown person or prior 
owner hid the drugs in the same compartment where 
part of the telephone was located. “Trial judges are 
not expected to leave their common sense at the 
door when they enter a courtroom,” said Justice 
Bennett for the unanimous Appeal Court. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
SAMPLE MUST BE RECEIVED 
DIRECTLY INTO INSTRUMENT
R.!v.!Mulroney,!2009 ONCA 766
At about 2:30 a.m. police saw the 
a c c u s e d d r iv i n g  h i s ve h i c l e 
erratically, weaving  from side to 
side.!The police stopped him and the 
accused failed a roadside breath test. 
He was arrested and taken to the police station for a 
breathalyzer test. He was charged with impaired 
driving and over 80mg%.
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the qualified 
breath technician testified he used an Intoxilyzer 
5000C that was designed to receive and analyze 
breath samples for blood alcohol concentration, that 
it appeared to be working  properly, and that the 
accused blew into the mouth-piece of the instrument 
as instructed, providing  two suitable samples for 
analysis.!At the conclusion of the Crown’s case, the 
accused successfully had the charge of impaired 
driving  dismissed.!He then moved to have the over 
80mg% charge dismissed, arguing  that there was no 
evidence that his breath sample went directly into 
the breathalyzer and that s. 258(1)(c)(iii) was 
therefore not complied with.! The trial judge 
dismissed the motion, instead holding  that there was 
evidence sufficient to conclude that the breath 
sample went directly into the instrument. The 
accused was convicted of over 80mg% and 
sentenced to an $800 fine and was prohibited from 
driving for 12-months.
The accused then successfully appealed to the 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice. The appeal judge 
held that there was no evidence that the mouth-
piece was connected to the Intoxilyzer or, even if it 
was, that there was no intervening  apparatus 
between the two.!The appeal judge concluded that 
there was no evidence that could properly lead to a 
reasonable inference that the breath samples were 
provided by the accused directly into the approved 
instrument. The accused’s  appeal  was allowed, his 
conviction was set aside, and an acquittal was 
entered.
“Trial judges are 
not expected to 
leave their 
common sense at 
the door when 
they enter a 
courtroom.” 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Proof
“It must be remembered that 
[ judges] are not expected to 
treat real life cases as a 
c o m p l e t e l y i n t e l l e c t u a l 
exercise where no conclusion can be reached if 
there is the slightest competing possibility. The 
criminal law requires a very high degree of 
proof, especially for inferences consistent with 
guilt, but it does not demand certainty.” - 
British Columbia Court of Appeal Justice 
McEachern in R. v. To,  1992 BCAC 223 at para. 41.
!!!"#$%&"'(
)
*+,-./0&0122-/03
4-,567-8-290:$$&
1;%<=>*1?=0@=A7@0>B7C0D=<D
!"#$ %&'$ (#)*+,#-$ .#/01$
2304$ !#56$ +5$ 0$ 5+781#$
7916+81#$ ,"3+,#$ :9+;$
4#5+/'#4$63$,"011#'/#$<39)$
9'4#)560'4+'/$ 3=$ 6"#$ 10>?$
@0,"$:9#56+3'$+5$A05#4$3'$0$,05#$=#069)#4$+'$6"+5$+559#?$
(##$80/#$BB$=3)$6"#$0'5>#)5?
C?$D11$3,,980'65$3=$0$*#"+,1#$0)#$8)#59786+*#1<$4#60+'#4$
>"#'$6"#$*#"+,1#$+5$56388#4$=3)$0$6)0==+,$*+3106+3'E
$ F0G$!)9#
$ FAG$H015#
$
I?$D5J+'/$0$4)+*#)$63$A13>$+'63$0'$3==+,#)K5$=0,#$=3)$6"#$
89)835#$ 3=$ 4#6#)7+'+'/$ 6"#$ 539),#$ 3=$ 0'$ 01,3"31$
3439)$+5$0$8#)7+55+A1#$5,)##'+'/$6#,"'+:9#$0'4$43#5$
'36$#'/0/#$6"#$)+/"6$63$,39'5#1$9'4#)$5?CLFAG$3=$6"#$$
M"0)6#)?
$ F0G$!)9#
$ FAG$H015#
$
B?$ N"+,"$ 8)3*+',#$ "04$ 6"#$ 7356$ 088#015$ A#=3)#$ 6"#$
(98)#7#$M39)6$3=$M0'040$+'$ILLOE$$
$ F0G$P)+6+5"$M3197A+0Q$
$ FAG$D1A#)60Q
$ F,G$R'60)+3Q
$ F4G$S9#A#,?
T?$!"#$+'=3)706+3'01$496<$+7835#4$3'$6"#$831+,#$9'4#)$
5?CLFAG$3=$6"#$M"0)6#)$+5$63$/+*#$6"#$4#60+'#4$8#)53'$
'36+,#$ 3=$ 6"#+)$ )+/"65U$ '36$ 63$ 6#11$ 6"#7$ "3>$ 63$
#V#),+5#$6"#7?$
$ F0G$!)9#
$ FAG$H015#
W?$D$831+,#$3==+,#)$'##4$'36$70J#$0$5?IWTFIG$M)+7+'01$
M34#$ 088)3*#4$ 5,)##'+'/$ 4#*+,#$ 4#70'4$
+'560'60'#3951<$983'$4+5,3*#)+'/$6"06$6"#$4)+*#)$"05$
01,3"31$ +'$ 6"#+)$ A34<U$ A96$ 5"3914$ 43$ 53$ 8)37861<$
0=6#)$6"#$)#:9+5+6#$5958+,+3'$+5$=3)7#4?$
$ F0G$!)9#
$ FAG$H015#
X?$ N"+,"$ 3=$ 6"#$ =3113>+'/$ >05$ 6"#$ 7356$ =)#:9#'6$
3==#',#$+'$04916$,)+7+'01$,39)6$+'$ILLXYILLOE
$$$$F0G$+780+)#4$4)+*+'/Q$
$ FAG$6"#=6Q
$ F,G$=)094Q
$ F4G$A)#0,"$3=$8)3A06+3'Q
$ F#G$4)9/$8355#55+3'?
!"#$!!%&'("$)*+#,
!"#$%&'()#'%*+,-.'-/+0#)*1)&1
23$-+#&')4+5"16-+$)7+#%+8%*7'1-&+/$-#$-&+#$-&-+
'7+7"99'8'-*#+ &-4'):4-+ '*9%&;)#'%*+%*+ #$-+:)7'7+
%9+ /$'8$+ #$-+ )"#$%&'('*6+ 5"16-+ 8%"41+ $).-+
6&)*#-1+#$-+)"#$%&'()#'%*<+
3$-+)"#$%&'('*6+ 5"16-+;"7#+:-+7)#'79'-1+#$)#+
#$-&-+)&-+&-)7%*):4-+)*1+=&%:):4-+6&%"*17+#%+:-4'-.-+#$)#+)*+
%99-*8-+$)7+:--*>+'7+:-'*6>+%&+'7+):%"#+#%+:-+8%;;'##-1>+)*1+
#$)#+ #$-+ )"#$%&'()#'%*+ 7%"6$#+ /'44+ )99%&1+ -.'1-*8-+%9+ #$)#+
%99-*8-<+?%/-.-&>+#$-+#&')4+5"16-+1%-7+*%#+7#)*1+'*+#$-+7$%-7+
%9+ #$-+ )"#$%&'('*6+ 5"16-+ /$-*+ 8%*1"8#'*6+ #$-+ &-.'-/<+ 3$-+
@"-7#'%*+9%&+#$-+#&')4+5"16-+'7+/$-#$-&+#$-&-+/)7+)*A+:)7'7+%*+
/$'8$+ #$-+ )"#$%&'('*6+ 5"16-+ 8%"41+ $).-+ 6&)*#-1+ #$-+
)"#$%&'()#'%*<+
3$-+#&')4+5"16-+7$%"41+%*4A+7-#+)7'1-+)*+)"#$%&'()#'%*+'9+7)#'79'-1+
%*+)44+#$-+;)#-&')4+=&-7-*#-1>+)*1+%*+8%*7'1-&'*6+B#$-+#%#)4'#A+
%9+#$-+8'&8";7#)*8-7C>+ #$)#+#$-&-+/)7+*%+:)7'7+%*+/$'8$+#$-+
)"#$%&'()#'%*+8%"41+:-+7"7#)'*-1<++3$-+#&')4+5"16-C7+9"*8#'%*+'7+
#%+ -D);'*-+ #$-+ 7"==%&#'*6+ )99'1).'#+ )7+ )+ /$%4->+ )*1+ *%#+ #%+
7":5-8#+'#+#%+)+B;'8&%78%='8+)*)4A7'7<CE+F+G&'#'7$+H%4";:')+H%"&#+
%9+!==-)4+H$'-9+I"7#'8-+J'*8$>+!"#$"#%&&#'()#*'+,#KLLM+GHH!+
KNL>+)#+=)&)7<+OKFON>+&-9-&-*8-7+%;'##-1<+
'-$)"+&.$.%&'%+/012"&
3$.4'*5"&-"$/&60$42$7&
81+9"0"+8"
1:;<=>?&@ABC&DEEF
!"#$ (#*#'6"$ Z3)6"$ D7#)+,0'$ M3'=#)#',#$ 3'$ ("0J#'$
P0A<$(<'4)37#YDA95+*#$[#04$!)0970$+5$A#+'/$"#14$3'$
R,63A#)$ W\OU$ ILL]$ +'$ A#096+=91$ ^0',39*#)U$ P)+6+5"$
M3197A+0?$!"+5$<#0)U$3*#)$CLL$58#,+01+;#4$#V8#)65$>+11$
A#$8)#5#'6+'/$=)37$0)39'4$6"#$>3)14U$+',194+'/$0$56)3'/$
1#/01$6)0,J?$
EEF?0>/2GH/I92EE$_)#*#'6$("0J#'$P0A<$(<'4)37#$PM$
"05$ 0))0'/#4$ 0$ /)398$ )06#$ )#49,6+3'$ =3)$ 011$ PM$
8)3=#55+3'015$ 0'4$ 80)#'65?$ !"#$ /)398$ )06#$ =3)$ PM$
066#'4##5$+5$3'1<$`CWL$a(b$=3)$6"#$=911$6")##$40<5$3=$
6)0+'+'/?$$N"#'$)#/+56#)+'/U$9'4#)$c)398$M34#$#'6#)$PM$
c)398$206#$63$)#,#+*#$6"#$4+5,39'6#4$)06#?$
H3)$ 73)#$ +'=3)706+3'$ 81#05#$ *+5+6$
GGGHI<J;KLMN>H<?OP:<JQ>?>J:>DEEF
www.10-8.ca
Volume 9 Issue 6 ! November/December 2009
PAGE 18
The Crown then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing  two points. First, as a matter of 
statutory interpretation, s.258(1)(c)(iii) does not 
require that a breath sample be received from an 
accused directly into an approved instrument in 
order for the evidence of the analysis to be 
conclusive proof of the concentration of alcohol in 
the accused’s blood.! The Crown submitted that in 
the wording  of the legislation, “directly” applied 
only if the breath sample is being  received into an 
approved container, but when it is being  received 
into an approved instrument there is no such 
constraint.! The Crown submitted that the section 
provided no constraint at all on how the breath 
sample gets into an approved instrument.! Second, 
the Crown argued that the trial judge was correct to 
find that there was evidence sufficient to conclude 
that the accused’s breath sample was received 
directly into the approved instrument. 
Justice Goudge, authoring  the opinion of the Ontario 
Court of Appeal, first outlined the requirements of 
the Criminal Code with respect to breath samples as 
it related to the appeal:
The Criminal Code provides 
that if certain conditions are 
met, the results of a breathalyser 
test constitute conclusive proof 
of the concentration of alcohol 
in an accused person’s blood, 
both at the time of the test and 
at the time when the offence 
was alleged to have been 
committed. One of these 
conditions is set by s. 258(1)(c)
(iii).! It requires that each sample be “received 
from the accused directly into an approved 
container or into an approved instrument 
operated by a qualified technician”.!... [para. 1]
As for the Crown’s first argument, it was rejected. 
Justice Goudge opined that “the Crown had to 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the breath 
samples were received into the approved instrument 
directly from the accused.” 
Because the section provides the Crown with 
proof that is deemed conclusive of the 
concentration of alcohol in an accused’s blood, I 
think that the liberty interest of the accused 
requires a strict interpretation of the section.! The 
same strict approach also serves the objective of 
preserving the integrity of the breath sample in 
order to ensure accurate results.! On the other 
hand , imp l i c i t i n t he s ec t i on i s t he 
contemplation that a breath sample could 
properly be received into an approved 
instrument not directly from an accused, but 
from an approved container, if there were any.!
With these considerations in mind, I think the 
proper interpretation of s. 258(1)(c)(iii) is that the 
breath sample from the accused must be 
received into an approved instrument either from 
an approved container if one is used, or, if not, 
directly into the approved instrument itself. 
[paras. 16-17]
But the Court of Appeal accepted the Crown’s 
second argument:
Here there was not just evidence that the 
breathalyser used was an approved instrument 
and a result was obtained.! Nor did the trial 
judge simply take judicial notice that this must 
mean that the breath sample 
was received directly into the 
instrument.![The qualified breath 
technician] testified that the 
instrument was designed to 
receive and analyse breath 
samples, that it appeared to be 
working properly, that the 
respondent blew into the 
mouth-piece of the instrument 
as instructed, and that this 
provided a suitable sample for 
analysis.!  None of this evidence was contested 
by the [accused].!
In my view, this was ample circumstantial 
evidence from which the trial judge could 
properly conclude as he did, namely that the 
[accused’s] breath samples were received 
directly into the approved instrument in this 
case. [paras. 21-21]
The Crown’s appeal was allowed and the accused’s 
conviction was restored. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
“[T]he proper interpretation 
of s. 258(1)(c)(iii) is that the 
breath sample from the 
accused must be received ... 
directly into the approved 
instrument itself.”
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RISK THAT DRIVER WOULD PUT 
CAR IN MOTION & CREATE 
DANGER ESTABLISHES CARE or 
CONTROL
R.!v.!Ruest,!2009 ONCA 841 !
!
At about 2:50 a.m. on New Year’s 
day the accused, who had been 
drinking  and celebrating  the New 
Year, left an Army Navy Club. 
S e v e r a l o f h i s f r i e n d s h a d 
e n c o u r a g e d him to call a taxi, rather than drive, 
because of his inebriated state.! However, he insisted 
he would drive and offered to give his friends a ride 
home.!One friend was so concerned that she called 
the police.!A police officer arrived about a minute 
after the call and saw one car parked in the Army 
Navy Club parking  lot.!The accused was scraping  ice 
off the its rear window.!The engine was running  and 
the accused’s fiancée was sitting  in the front 
passenger’s seat.!
The police officer approached the accused and 
spoke to him.!He had difficulty standing  on the icy 
parking  lot and the officer noticed other signs of 
impairment.! Because there were no keys in the 
vehicle, the officer asked the accused to give him 
the keys.! In response, he pulled the keys out of his 
pocket and gave them to the police officer.! There 
was a remote starter on the key chain and the car 
could not be driven until the key was inserted in the 
vehicle.!The accused was arrested and a subsequent 
analysis of his breath revealed blood-alcohol levels 
of 160mg% and 150mg%. He was charged with 
care or control while impaired under s.253(1)(a) 
and blowing over under s.253(1)(b).!
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the judge 
made the following findings of fact:
• the accused’s car was parked in the parking  lot of 
the Army Navy Club;
• the car was operable;
• the accused was standing  at the car clearing  ice 
from the window;
BY THE BOOK:
 s. 258(1)(c)(iii) Criminal Code
s.258. (1) In any proceedings under 
subsection 255(1) in respect of an 
offence committed under section 253 
or subsection 254(5) or in any 
proceedings under any of subsections 
255(2) to (3.2) ...
(c) where samples of the breath of the accused have 
been taken pursuant to a demand made under 
subsection 254(3), if ...
(iii) each sample was received from the accused 
directly into an approved container or into an 
approved instrument operated by a qualified 
technician …
evidence of the results of the analyses so made is 
conclusive proof that the concentration of alcohol in 
the accused’s blood both at the time when the 
analyses were made and at the time when the 
offence was alleged to have been committed was, if 
the results of the analyses are the same, the 
concentration determined by the analyses and, if the 
results of the analyses are different, the lowest of the 
concentrations determined by the analyses, in the 
absence of evidence tending to show all of the 
following  three things — that the approved 
instrument was malfunctioning or was operated 
improperly, that the malfunction or improper 
operation resulted in the determination that the 
concentration of alcohol in the accused’s blood 
exceeded 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood, and 
that the concentration of alcohol in the accused’s 
blood would not in fact have exceeded 80 mg of 
alcohol in 100 mL of blood at the time when the 
offence was alleged to have been committed[.] 
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• the accused intended to get into his car and drive 
away in the immediate future and would have 
done so, but for the arrival of the police officer;
• the accused engaged the engine of the motor 
vehicle using a remote starter device;
• the accused had the keys to the car;
• the accused had opened the driver’s side door 
and removed the snow scraper;
• the accused did not sit in the driver’s seat and 
had not inserted the key in the ignition; and
• the car could not move without the key being 
inserted in the ignition.
Despite these findings the judge nonetheless 
concluded the accused was not in care or control. 
He had been intercepted prior to entering  the 
vehicle and prior to inserting  the key into the 
ignition. Thus, there was no present danger. The 
accused was neither in the vehicle nor in a position 
to bring  about any danger or harm to anyone within 
the meaning  to be given to the legislation. The 
accused was therefore acquitted because there was 
no proof of “some actual evidence of risk or danger, 
as might occur by starting  to enter the vehicle or by 
placing the key in the ignition”.
The Crown appealed to the Ontario Superior Court 
of Justice, but the accused’s acquittal was upheld. 
The appeal judge ruled that the Crown had not 
proven the actus reus of the offence of “care or 
control”- the risk necessary.!  The 
Crown again appealed, this time 
to the Ontario Court of Appeal. 
Justice Doherty, delivering  the 
judgment of the Ontario Court of 
Appeal, ruled the lower courts 
appl ied a too narrow and 
restrictive notion of the degree of 
risk required in determining 
whether a person was in care or 
control. 
In earlier, but binding  appellate 
authorities, the actus reus of care 
or control was described as “the act or conduct of 
the accused in relation to that motor vehicle must be 
such that there is created a risk of danger, whether 
from putting  the car in motion or in some other 
way.” (see R. v. Wren (2000), 144 C.C.C. (3d)  374 (Ont.C.A.) 
As a result, Justice Doherty then framed the question 
on appeal as: “did the conduct of the [accused] in 
relation to his car create a risk that the [accused], 
while impaired, would put his car is motion and 
thereby create a danger?” He answered it this way:
... [The accused’s] stated intention to get in his 
car and drive away in the immediate future was 
the paramount feature of the risk assessment to 
be made in this case.!An intention to drive the 
vehicle is not an essential element of the offence 
of “care or control”. ...  It is, however, part of the 
conduct of the accused that is relevant to the 
determination of whether that conduct in 
relation to the motor vehicle had created a risk 
of danger.! The [accused’s] intention to get into 
the car and drive away, probably within seconds, 
had the officer not arrived certainly magnifies 
the risk that the [accused] would put his car in 
motion and create a danger.
The [accused’s] car was operable, running and 
sitting  in an unobstructed parking  lot, and the 
[accused] had the keys in his pocket.! He 
intended to drive away, presumably as soon as 
the window was cleared.! With respect to the 
decisions below, it is impossible to say on these 
findings of fact that the [accused] was not in 
care or control of the vehicle ....!  Speculation as 
to when the [accused] first assumed the 
necessary care or control of the vehicle is 
i r relevant to his cr iminal 
liability.!The point is that by the 
time the officer arrived and 
stopped the [accused] from 
getting into his vehicle and 
driving  away, the [accused] had 
taken steps to start the vehicle 
and prepare for its immediate 
depar tu re .! There was an 
obvious, significant risk that the 
[accused] would put the car in 
motion and endanger the 
public.!
.........
In this case, the existence of the 
“An intention to drive the 
vehicle is not an essential 
element of the offence of 
“care or control”. ...  It is, 
however, part of the conduct 
of the accused that is relevant 
to the determination of 
whether that conduct in 
relation to the motor vehicle 
had created a risk of danger.”
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mischief targeted by the “care or control” 
criminal prohibition is all the more obvious in 
that the [accused] fully intended to get into his 
car and drive away.!This was not a case where 
liability turned on a possible risk that the vehicle 
might be started despite the driver’s intention not 
to start the vehicle.!Rather, this is a case where a 
driver was standing  at a fully operable vehicle 
with the keys and  with the intention to get in 
the vehicle and drive it away.! [references 
omitted, paras. 15-18]
In Justice Doherty’s view, the facts unequivocally 
established the legal elements of the offence of “care 
or control” and the accused was guilty. The Crown’s 
appeal was allowed, the accused’s acquittal was set 
aside, and a conviction of impaired care and control 
was entered. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
UNLAWFUL PURPOSE MUST BE 
DIFFERENT FROM SUBSEQUENT 
OFFENCE
R.!v.!Quinn,!2009 ONCA 817
!!!!!!
The accused answered a telephone 
call the complainant made to an 
e sco r t agency.! Once in the 
compla inan t ’s home, hav ing 
concluded some pre l iminary 
negotiations and activities, the accused went 
downstairs on the pretence of getting  a drink of 
water.!She unlocked the door to the house.!By pre-
arrangement, others entered the residence, 
handcuffed and beat the complainant with the butt 
of an imitation firearm, and ransacked the premises, 
taking  various items with them as they left, closely 
followed by the accused. At trial in British Columbia 
Supreme Court the judge explained the requirements 
of liability, including  the grounds that the accused 
was a party to the principals’ offences under s.21(2) 
of the Criminal Code because she formed a common 
intention with them to commit and to help them 
commit robbery. The jury found the accused guilty of 
robbery, using  an imitation firearm while committing 
robbery, unlawful confinement and assault causing 
bodily harm arising  out of her conduct during  the 
home invasion.
The accused appealed arguing, among  other 
grounds, that the trial judge failed to adequately 
instruct the jury on the objective foreseeability 
component in s.21(2) of the Criminal Code. The 
British Columbia Court of Appeal agreed:
The “unlawful purpose” in s. 21(2) must be 
different from the “offence” the principal 
commits in carrying  out the common purpose. ... 
In this instance, the same robbery cannot serve 
as both the “unlawful purpose” and the 
“offence”.!  If s. 21(2) applied at all in this case, 
the more appropriate “unlawful purpose” may 
have been a home invasion or the unlawful entry 
offence of s. 349(1) of the Criminal Code. [para. 
12]
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
“Care or Control”
“The mischief sought to be 
prohibited by the section as 
expressed by the wording is 
that an intoxicated person 
who is in the immediate presence of a motor 
vehicle with the means of controlling it or 
setting it in motion is or may be a danger to the 
public.  Even if he has no immediate intention 
of setting it in motion he can at any instant 
determine to do so, because his judgment may 
be so impaired that he cannot foresee the 
possible consequences of his actions.” - New 
Brunswick Court of Appeal in R. v. Price (1978), 40 
C.C.C. (2d) 378 (N.B.C.A.)  at p.384.
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The jury was not properly instructed on the legal 
principles that they were to apply to determine 
whether the the accused’s guilt had ben established 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Her appeal was 
allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new 
trial was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
IMPAIRED AMENDMENTS OPERATE 
RETROSPECTIVELY
R.!v.!Dineley,!2009 ONCA 814
The accused went to a nightclub to 
drink with several friends.! He 
returned to his car and soon after he 
started driving  the car mounted a 
curb and struck a parked vehicle. The 
police arrived to investigate the accident and 
conducted breath tests that produced blood alcohol 
concentrations of 99mg% and 97mg%.!The accused 
was charged with impaired driving  and driving  over 
80mg%.
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the accused 
raised the “Carter defence”. The Crown then pointed 
out that s.258 of the Criminal Code had been 
a m e n d e d a n d t h e p r o v i s i o n s o p e r a t e d 
retrospectively. Thus, the accused’s proposed 
toxicology evidence would be irrelevant. The trial 
judge, however, concluded that the Crown could not 
raise the issue at this point and the evidence related 
to the Carter defence resulted in the accused’s 
acquittal. The Crown then appealed the accused’s 
acquittal for driving  over 80mg% to the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice, again arguing  that the 
amendments to s.258 applied retrospectively to 
offences committed before it came into effect, but 
involving  trials commencing  or continuing  after that 
date. The appeal judge concluded it was not 
improper for the Crown to raise the retrospectivity 
issue when the trial resumed, but held Bill C-2 (the 
amendments to the Criminal Code) did not apply 
retrospectively.!In his view, the amendments virtually 
eliminated a defence and were therefore substantive 
law and not exclusively procedural.! Thus, the 
amendments could only take prospective effect. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed and the accused’s 
acquittal was upheld. 
The Crown then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal. Justice MacPherson, writing  the unanimous 
judgment, first found the amendments of Bill C-2 
were essentially procedural or evidentiary in nature, 
not substantive in nature. He then went on to 
conclude that the amendments did not eliminate the 
Carter defence: 
The Carter defence has not been virtually 
eliminated, neutered or abolished.!  It has been 
changed, but it survives in a different form, 
subject as always to the ingenuity of defence 
lawyers and the new jurisprudence that the 
courts will inevitably enunciate.![para. 26] 
Instead, the defence will need to shift its direction to 
the reliability of the approved instrument by such 
things as cross-examining  the operator, or pointing 
to an error on the face of the test records or a 
problem with the alcohol standard solution. In 
Justice MacPherson’s opinion, the amendments 
merely altered the evidentiary content of a defence 
and did not remove or eliminate it, therefore the 
provisions applied restrospectively. The Crown’s 
appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
BY THE BOOK:
 s. 21(2) Criminal Code
s. 21(2) Where two or more persons 
form an intention in common to 
carry out an unlawful purpose and 
to assist each other therein and 
any one of them, in carrying out 
the common purpose, commits an 
offence, each of them who knew or ought to have 
known that the commission of the offence would 
be a probable consequence of carrying out the 
common purpose is a party to that offence.
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THE ‘CARTER DEFENCE’
What is the Carter defence? It is also known as the 
two drink defence. In the National Survey of Crown 
Prosecutors and Defence Counsel on Impaired 
Driving (June 2009), the Carter or two drink defence 
is described as follows:
With the “2-drink” defence, the accused 
suggests that the evidential breath test result 
must be incorrect because it is incompatible 
with other evidence (e.g., testimony of the 
accused or witnesses, receipts to demonstrate 
the amount of alcohol consumed, etc.). The 
defence will also often present testimony from 
an expert witness (e.g., a toxicologist) that, based 
on evidence of the amount of alcohol the 
accused reported he/she consumed, the 
accused’s BAC would have been less than that 
recorded by the evidential test. [at p. 43]
With Bill C-2, the Tackling Violent Crime Act, s.
258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code was amended on July 
2, 2008  to now provide that the result of a driver’s 
lowest breath test is conclusive proof that their blood 
alcohol concentration at the time of the offence, in 
the absence of evidence tending to show that:
the approved instrument was malfunctioning 
or was operated improperly, 
the malfunction or improper operation resulted 
in the determination that the concentration of 
alcohol in the accused’s blood exceeded 80 
mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood, and 
the concentration of alcohol in the accused’s 
blood would not in fact have exceeded 80 mg 
of alcohol in 100 mL of blood at the time 
when the offence was alleged to have been 
committed.
Furthermore, s.258 (d.01) excludes the following  as 
evidence tending  to show that an approved 
instrument was malfunctioning, was operated 
improperly, or the analysis was performed 
improperly:
the amount of alcohol that the accused 
consumed, 
the rate at which the alcohol that the accused 
consumed would have been absorbed and 
eliminated by the accused’s body, or 
a calculation based on that evidence of what 
the concentration of alcohol in the accused’s 
blood would have been at the time when the 
offence was alleged to have been committed. 
Other Impaired/Over 80 mg% Defences:
Last Drink defence - the accused alleges that their 
pattern of alcohol consumption was such that the 
blood alcohol concentration was still rising  at the 
time they were driving  and that it had not yet 
exceeded 80mg%.
!
Drinking  After Driving  defence - the accused alleges 
that they consumed alcohol after driving  but before 
the samples were taken. Thus the reading  at the time 
of driving  was actually lower (and below the legal 
limit) than at the time of test when the alcohol had 
been absorbed and showed a reading  higher than 
the legal limit.
Bolus (or Mouth  Alcohol) defence - the accused 
alleges that the blood alcohol concentration reading 
over the legal limit was artificially high due to mouth 
alcohol arising  from alcohol immediately prior to 
the stop. The observation period before and between 
each sample makes it unlikely that mouth alcohol is 
the source of an elevated reading. 
SAY WHAT?
Prospective - looking towards the future
Retrospective - looking backwards
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Charter Defences
Right to Counsel defence  - the accused alleges that 
the police violated their constitutional right to 
counsel under s.10(b) of the Charter  and therefore 
the breathalyzer readings should be excluded under 
s.24(2). 
Unreasonable Search & Seizure defence  - the 
accused alleges that the police did not have the 
requisite reasonable suspicion under s.254(2) of the 
Criminal Code for the ASD demand, which then 
provided the reasonable grounds necessary for the 
breathalyzer demand and resultant breath samples. 
Or, the accused alleges that the police officer did 
not have the requisite reasonable belief to demand a 
breath sample under s.254(3). If successful, the 
accused will make an application to have the 
breathalyzer readings excluded under s.24(2) of the 
Charter resulting from the s.8 breach.
Arbitrary Detention defence  - the accused alleges 
they were detained arbitrarily under s.9 of the 
Charter and the evidence flowing  therefrom is 
inadmissible under s.24(2).
OTHER NOTE-ABLE REPORT RESULTS
Paperwork - “Lawyers agree that the most 
compelling  evidence, again, in addition to the BAC, 
comes from the police (e.g., paperwork containing 
details of the investigation). “ (at p. 52)
Video Evidence - “Crown prosecutors and 
defence counsel note that video at the roadside is 
almost never available, and video taken during 
booking  or the breath test is available slightly more 
often. Even though such video is not often available, 
both Crown  prosecutors and defence counsel agree 
that it can sometimes or often be of considerable 
value, resulting  in a guilty plea, a conviction at trial, 
or an acquittal.” (at p. 52) 
Evidence of Impairment - “A majority of Crown 
prosecutors across jurisdictions (50-70%) believe 
that police officers rely too heavily on the BAC result 
(CCC s. 253(b)) as evidence of impairment, to the 
detriment of other evidence related to behavioural 
signs of impairment. As a result, Crown must more 
often proceed on the ‘over 80’ charge instead of the 
‘impaired driving’ charge. Unfortunately, when cases 
are challenged in Court and the results of the breath 
test are brought into question, the Crown do not 
often have behavioural evidence to demonstrate the 
defendant was impaired and prove any impaired 
driving  charge (CCC s.253 (a)). So when the breath 
result is challenged by defence counsel, prosecutors 
encounter substantial difficulty proving  the case 
beyond a reasonable doubt and these cases can 
result in an acquittal despite a positive BAC reading 
based on a two tier evaluation and a certificate from 
the breath technician.” (p. 53)
Police Training  - “To facilitate the accurate and 
relevant collection of evidence and its presentation 
in Court, a majority (85%) of prosecutors agreed that 
police officers can benefit from more training  in the 
Did You Know
“Lawyers general ly agree that 
impaired driving cases can be 
challenging to process as they 
frequently involve more scientific 
and technical  evidence and complex 
legal arguments, relative to other 
types of CCC cases. In fact, due to 
the nature of the evidence, these cases are 
often considered as challenging as homicides 
and sexual assaults. As such, the manner in 
which evidence is collected, documented, and 
presented in Court can significantly impact 
outcomes.” !National Sur vey of Crow! 
Prosecutors and Defence Counsel on Impaired 
Driving #June 2009$ at p. 51!52.
s.10(b) Charter - Everyone has the right on arrest 
or detention ... (b) to retain and instruct counsel 
without delay and to be informed of that right; ...
s.8 Charter - Everyone has the right to be secure 
against unreasonable search or seizure.
s.9 Charter - Everyone has the right not to be 
arbitrarily detained or imprisoned.
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enforcement of impaired driving  laws as well as in 
giving Court testimony.” (p. 54)
Case Preparation - ”[T]he survey revealed that 
defence counsel spend at least twice as many hours, 
and in some instances, four times as many hours 
preparing  for impaired driving  cases as do 
Crown.” (p. 63)
Conviction Rate - “The average overall conviction 
rate (including  plea agreements, guilty pleas and 
convictions at trial) for impaired driving  cases is 
78%. This is comparable to a recent Statistics 
Canada study revealed that Criminal Code traffic 
offences had findings of guilt in almost 80% of cases 
(CTV 2008). ... Based on the findings from this 
survey, a majority of jurisdictions report an overall 
estimated conviction rate of 72%-73%. Higher 
overall conviction rates are reported in the 
Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Northwest Territories 
region (86%) and the Atlantic region (90%). 
Nationally, the average overall conviction rate for 
impaired driving cases is 78%.” (p. 65) 
Reasons for Acquittal - “More prevalent issues 
related to acquittals are linked to procedures and 
practices followed by police during  an investigation 
and arrest ... More than 1/3 of prosecutors and 
defence counsel (37% and 43% respectively) agree 
that  improper procedures by arresting  officers are 
always or often a problem. Defence counsel is 
somewhat more likely to report that officers did not 
have reasonable suspicion for an ASD demand; 17% 
of Crown and 26% of defence counsel say that 
officers always or often do not have reasonable and 
probable grounds for an evidential breath or blood 
test. Errors in police paper work were cited by 
prosecutors and defence counsel as always or often 
an issue in 13% and 16% of cases respectively. 
Prevalent issues related to acquittals are linked to 
procedures and practices followed by police during 
an investigation and arrest.” (p. 68)
“The Charter issues most frequently raised include: 
officers not having  reasonable and probable grounds 
(RPG) for arrest, section 8  pertaining  to search and 
seizure, section 9 involving  the right not to be 
arbitrarily detained, and section 10(b) which is the  
right to retain and instruct counsel without delay. 
Occasional and infrequent references to other 
Charter sections were noted, but not raised as 
serious concerns.” (p. 71)
Training, Training  & More Training  - “Impaired 
driving  cases are complex due to the nature of 
intersecting  scientific, legal and constitutional issues. 
Case law in this area has grown exponentially, 
making  it difficult for police and lawyers to keep 
abreast of current decisions. ... 
It cannot be overlooked that, while Charter issues 
pose a considerable challenge in the processing  of 
impaired driving  cases, this is not unusual. In fact, 
these issues impact a broad cross-section of cases 
and will likely continue to do so in the future. 
However, efforts can be taken to minimize their 
impact by ensuring  that police are aware of relevant 
cases as the law evolves, and understand what 
impact these decisions will have on their 
investigative procedures. Crown and defence 
counsel can play a significant role in ensuring  that 
officers are well-equipped to navigate constitutional 
issues in the future. 
The findings also suggest that the processing  of cases 
can be improved with some practical measures. To 
begin, Crown and police can benefit from more 
consistent and sustained institutional efforts 
regarding  education and training  in this area, 
particularly in light of the rapidly evolving 
jurisprudence. Some jurisdictions have more 
ongoing  and comprehensive initiatives than others 
however, they are frequently ad hoc and informal. 
Unfortunately, educational and training  efforts are 
driven internally, often as a function of  policy, 
available resources, and competing  priorities. To this 
end, better and more consistent education and 
training  initiatives for practitioners on impaired 
driving  issues can help agencies move collectively 
towards reducing  or eliminating  cases in which 
evidentiary issues lead to an acquittal.” (p. 108)
Complete report available at:
h t tp : / /www.t i r f .ca /publ ica t ions /PDF_publ ica t ions /
Lawyers_Survey_Report_Final_2009.pdf
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REQUEST FOR DRIVER TO EXIT 
VEHICLE IS NOT COMPELLED 
PARTICIPATION IN ROADSIDE 
TESTS
R. v. Quenneville, 2009 ONCA 325
At about 2:20 a.m. in mid-December 
a police officer saw a vehicle 
travelling  at an abnormally slow 
speed. The officer followed the 
vehicle and activated his emergency 
lights to stop the vehicle, but the vehicle continued 
for about two blocks after the emergency lights were 
activated and then turned into a residential driveway 
and stopped. The officer approached the driver's side 
of the vehicle and the driver opened his door. A 
smell of alcohol was detected and the driver was 
requested to produce his driver’s license, insurance 
and ownership papers. The driver's speech was 
slurred and he was asked to exit the vehicle, 
stumbled while getting  out. The driver placed his 
hand on the ground when he stumbled and when he 
attempted to stand up, he stumbled backwards into 
his vehicle and could not stand without leaning  on 
his vehicle. 
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the police 
officer testified that he stopped the vehicle for a 
sobriety check given the hour (2:20 a.m.), the 
abnormally slow driving  speed and the time of year 
(holiday season) he suspected the driver might be 
impaired. The driver not immediately stopping 
reinforced his suspicion. The accused was convicted 
of impaired under s.253(a) of the Criminal Code.
The accused appealed to the Ontario Superior Court 
of Justice submitting  that the evidence observed by 
the police officer when he was ordered to exit the 
vehicle was not admissible. The appeal judge found 
that if the accused had exited the vehicle voluntarily 
then the stumbling  evidence would have been 
admissible. On the other hand, if the accused exited 
the vehicle pursuant to a demand for sobriety 
screening  pursuant to s.48(1) of the Highway Traffic 
Act then it could not be used as evidence of 
impairment at trial. The Crown argued that asking 
the accused to exit his vehicle and observing  the 
manner in which he did was not a sobriety screening 
test, analogizing  the order to exit the vehicle to the 
order to produce the driver's documents. The appeal 
judge rejected this analogy noting  that the officer 
was authorized by law to request the driver's 
documents and, other than pursuant to s.48(1) of the 
Highway Traffic Act or for officer safety, he had no 
authority to ask the accused to exit his vehicle. Since 
the trial judge failed to address the admissibility of 
the stumbling  evidence (which may or may not have 
been admissible), the accused’s appeal was allowed 
and a new trial was ordered. 
The Crown then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal which restored the accused’s conviction at 
trial. “The line drawn ... as to the limitation on the 
use of evidence acquired at the roadside, is 
evidence obtained through the ‘compelled direct 
participation’ in sobriety trials,” said the Court in a 
short endorsement. “The observations made as the 
[accused] exited his vehicle, even in response to a 
direction from the officer, is not compelled direct 
participation in the roadside tests so as to attract the 
limitation on use.”
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Did You Know
“Today, defendants are willing to go 
to trial because the potential payoff 
is significant. One commonality that 
cannot be overlooked is the distinct 
willingness of people to fight to avoid a 
criminal conviction as well as the one 
year driving prohibition. These findings 
clearly demonstrate that, in the face of such 
severe penalties, many of those accused of 
impaired driving see the penalties as an 
incentive to go to great lengths to avoid a 
conviction, which has substantial implications 
for the ability of the justice system to manage 
such cases in its current form.” !National 
Survey of Crown Prosecutors and Defence Counsel 
on Impaired Driving #June 2009$ at p. 111.
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CONTINUED SEARCH AFTER 
DISAVOWING SAFETY 
RATIONALE INAPPROPRIATE
R.!v.!Aselford et al.,!2009 ONCA 28
After stopping  a vehicle a police 
officer saw guns in plan view in 
the back seat. The accused told the 
officer that the guns were toys, 
which the officer confirmed, but 
she continued searching  the vehicle anyways. The 
officer subsequently located a bag  of marihuana and 
the accused was charged. 
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the officer 
testified that once she knew the guns were toys she 
“didn’t need to investigate further.” The evidence 
was clear that the discovery of the toy guns and the 
BY THE BOOK:
 s. 48(1) Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act
s.48(1) A police officer, readily 
identifiable as such, may require 
the driver of a motor vehicle to 
s t o p f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f 
determining  whether or not there 
is evidence to justify making  a 
demand under section 254 of the Criminal Code 
(Canada).
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Admissibility of Non Compelled 
Roadside Observations
“I have concluded that the 
provisions allowing for a breach 
of the motorist's s. 10(b) rights at 
the roadside would not be saved 
under s. 1 if the evidence resulting from 
compelled participation in the tests -- designed 
to firm up mere suspicion of impairment or a 
blood-alcohol level exceeding 80 mg. -- could be 
used for trial purposes to incriminate and 
convict a motorist of either offence. I wish to 
make it clear that this conclusion applies only to 
evidence obtained from compelled direct 
participation by the motorist in roadside tests 
authorized by s. 48(1) of the HTA, specifically 
designed to determine impairment or a blood-
alcohol level exceeding 80 mg.  I am not referring 
to observations the officer might make of the 
driver while carrying out other authorized 
duties.   Thus, by way of example, an officer may 
observe signs of impairment in a driver, such as a 
strong odour of alcohol, blood-shot and glassy 
eyes, dilated pupils, slurred speech, unsteadiness 
of gait upon the driver exiting the vehicle, or 
other similar signs. These observations would be 
admissible at trial to prove impairment.” - 
Ontario Court of Appeal Justice Moldaver in R. v. 
Milne  (1996), 107 C.C.C. (3d) 118 (Ont.C.A.) .
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marihuana were not simultaneous and the officer 
did not have reasonable grounds to search the 
vehicle. The trial judge concluded that the 
continuation of the search after the guns were 
ascertained to be toys was completely inappropriate 
and the police breached the accused’s Charter rights. 
The marihuana was excluded as evidence and the 
accused was acquitted. 
The Crown then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing  the discovery of the marihuana was 
legal because the officer safety rationale allowed the 
officer to continue the search. However, as the Court 
of Appeal noted, the officer disclaimed a safety 
rationale for continuing  the search when she 
confirmed the guns were toys. Unless the officer 
seized the toy guns and marihuana at the same time, 
the officer needed reasonable grounds to continue 
the search after learning  the guns were toys, which 
she did not have. The Ontario Court of Appeal 
upheld the s.8  breach as well as the trial judge’s s. 
24(2) analysis. The Crown’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
CHARTER ARGUMENT NOT 
RAISED AT TRIAL DISMISSED ON 
APPEAL
R.!v.! Sterling,!2009 ONCA 65
The police entered an apartment with 
the permission of a homeowner and 
subsequently charged the accused, 
who was found therein. The accused 
argued his Charter rights were 
breached but the Ontario Superior Court of Justice 
held the accused did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the apartment and the 
police entered with the permission of the 
homeowner. The accused was convicted and 
sentenced to 4" years in prison.
The accused then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal, attempting  to re-characterize his Charter 
claim to now argue that he was subjected to an 
investigative detention, that he was unlawfully 
searched, and that his s.10(b) rights were breached. 
The Court of Appeal refused to hear the arguments 
about detention and the right to counsel because 
they were not raised at trial. However, even if the 
accused was detained for investigation the police 
actions did not amount to a search:
• the accused’s clothing  and appearance were 
in plain view;
• the accused was asked for identification and 
provided it; 
• the police did not do a pat-down search of 
the accused until after his arrest; and
• although the accused answered some police 
questions, he eventually refused to answer 
them or to cooperate with the police.
And even if the accused’s s.8  Charter rights were 
breached the evidence was nonetheless admissible 
under s.24(2). The accused’s conviction and 
sentence appeals were  dismissed.!
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
See page 13
